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Fifty years ago Professor Hessel Yntema sketched the progress of the unification
of law in the United States. 1 This progress, he wrote, presents a "complex picture." A
large, diversified country necessarily requires a complicated governmental, structure
that balances national interests and local liberties. The 'resulting complexity is
accentuated by history. The United States traces its roots to geographically dispersed
communities of inhabitants migrating from different countries and bringing with them
different cultural baggage. Subsequent rapid industrialization introduced new pro-
blems and exacerbated old ones. Industrial accidents, complex corporate structures,
labor unions, and urbanization have induced increasingly detailed regulation. Yet,
despite this complexity and diversity, Professor Yntema suggests that there is a
fundamental unity of law in the United States. He attributes this unity not only to basic
cultural factors, such as a common language, but also to specific institutions:
1) federal legislation and the influence of the federal judiciary,
2) the conception of a common law, as especially inculcated by the leading
law schools and the legal literature produced under their influence,
3) the activities of the national bar associations,
4) the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and
5) the American Law Institute. 2
With quick, deft strokes, Professor Yntema outlines each of these institutions. He
concludes by observing that these institutions have focused on uniformity of domestic
James Cleo Thompson Sr. Trustee Professor of Law, S.M.U. School of Law, Dallas, Texas.1 Hessel E. Yntema, Unification of Law in the United States, in UNIDROIT, L'Unification du
droit/Unification of Law 301 (1948). The first paragraph of the present text summarizes Prof. Yntema's essay
using words and shorter phrases from the essay without specific attribution.
2 Id. at 305.
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law to meet domestic needs. This focus, he notes, has "virtually eclipsed effective
participation in efforts to attain unity of law on an international scale."
3
Surprisingly little has changed in the intervening fifty years. Professor Yntema today
would recognize the landscape even if not the details. Federalism remains vibrant.
Cultural roots continue to diversify. Technological developments continue to spawn
new problems and added complexity. Yet law in the United States is no less uniform
than it was fifty years ago. Indeed, arguably, the law is even more uniform today. If so,
the same five institutions Professor Yntema identifies are largely responsible.
In one respect, however, there has been change: the United States no longer ig-
nores efforts "to attain unity of law on an international scale" and there is considerably
more organized interest in the comparative study of law. In 1964 the United States
joined the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law and the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. Delegations from the United States now
participate actively in the unification efforts not only of these bodies but also of the
United Nationa Commission on International Trade Law and the Organization of
American States. These efforts have borne fruit. The United States is now a party to
several uniform law conventions, most notably the 1980 United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. At the same time, all law schools
now offer at least one comparative law course and a steady flow of comparative law
studies appears in the law reviews. While there still is no official national center for
comparative law studies on the model of UNIDROIT or the Max Planck Institute in
Hamburg, there is an active American Society of Comparative Law - one of whose
founders was Hessel Yntema. Professor Yntema would, if he were with us today,
quickly note and approve these developments.
If asked today to sketch again the progress of the uniformity of law in the United
States, Professor Yntema would no doubt delight to see both the old landmarks and the
new growth. In his absence, the present essay revisits the scene of Professor Yntema's
earlier work. The essay first asks whether his sketch is accepted as an accurate rendering
of the landscape. It then examines what has happened to the five "institutions" he identi-
fies as influences on the promotion of unification. A comment on the development
and implications of U.S. interest in transnational uniform law projects follows.
I. - Implicit in Professor Yntema's essay is the suggestion that there is a trend
toward greater unification of law in the United States and that this is a Good Thing.
He begins his essay by stating that "the progress of unification of law in the United
States presents a complex picture" (emphasis added). He later talks of institutions
"promoting" unity, the "gradual expansion" of federal legislation, and the "not incon-
siderable and yet not satisfactory" history of adoption of uniform State laws. At the
same time, however, he suggests a more static picture: it is remarkable, he says, to find
at the time he writes "fundamental unity in law" despite the diversity and complexity
3 Id. at 317.
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of the political, social, and economic context in the United States. Not that there is
complete uniformity, as he clearly recognizes elsewhere. Rather, the suggestion is that
continuing movement towards uniformity has already achieved significant uniformity.
Not all historians would agree with this optimistic picture. Professor Lawrence
Friedman, for example, writes that "[o]ne of the great, and constant, themes of Ameri-
can'law is the pushing and pulling of these forces: uniformity and diversity, in constant
tension over time." 4 Professor Whitmore Gray, who, like Professor Yntema, teaches at
the University of Michigan Law School, agrees. In a detailed 1986 report on the unifi-
cation of law in the United States, Professor Gray cites Professor Friedman's comment
with approval and adds that "the United States experience in unification to date is not
very encouraging." 5 While recognizing that there has been "considerable movement
toward uniformityand harmonization" (due at least as much, he argues, to the desire to
reform the law as to make the law uniform), Professor Gray concludes that the "tanta-
lizing question" is why, despite this considerable movement, "diversity in private law
[is] still the norm and uniformity the exception in the United States today?" 6 Readers
might reconcile this conclusion with Professor Yntema's view by noting that Professor
Gray emphasizes private law, while Professor Yntema talks more generally about the
"legal system," including federal public law that usually preempts State law and is there-
fore by definition uniform. But even if formally reconcilable, the two views reflect
very different emphases on both the value of uniformity and the actual progress made
in unification.
Which view is more accurate? The historical record surely supports the view that
the general public and even the legal community place "unification of law" low on
th'eir list of values held. To the extent uniformity is introduced by federal legislation,
history reflects the continuing tension between advocates of decentralized power and
supporters of centralized regulation. Public debate between these proponents,
however, rarely refers to the need for uniform law as opposed to other values, such as
the need to protect "basic" rights or to correct problems of a national scope. If,
therefore, Professor Yntema implies that there is a conscious desire for the unification
of law he exaggerates the importance of this value. As for the extent of progress in
unification, one is tempted to suggest that the two views are like those shown in a
recent cartoon: one character is happy because the glass of wine is half full, while the
other is unhappy because the glass is half empty. The suggestion, however, is too
facile. From the perspective of persons trained in a differen t legal culture, Professor
Yntema probably paints a more accurate picture. Despite the diversity'in private law
noted by Professor Gray and relatively'limited application of federal legislation, the
legal system - including not just formal legal rules, but also the participants,
4 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 36 (2d ed. 1985).
5 Whitmore Gray, E pluribus unum? A Bicentennial Report on Unification of Law in the United
States, 50 Rabels Z. 111, 112 (1986).
6 Id. at 112 & 155.
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procedures and institutions that support and apply these rules - incorporates signi-
ficant common assumptions and practices.
II. - Whether or not they agree on the progress that has been achieved,
Professors Yntema and Gray have virtually identical lists of the institutions working
loward unification. Professor Gray reports on the work of the Commissioners on
Jniform State Laws, the American Law Institute, and the American Bar Association
-le also examines the role of the federal and State legislation, as well as that of th
opinions of federal and State courts. He concludes with comments on legal education,
legal literature, and legal research tools. Although Professor Gray's analysis of these
institutions is more recent and more detailed than that of Professor Yntema, there is a
remarkable coincidence in the factors proposed. The following brief comments
examine each of the institutions in the order Professor Yntema proposes.
(1) FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Federal legislation that preempts the law of individual States would provide
formal uniformity because there would be only a single law. The U.S. Constitution, how-
ever, only delegates to the federal government specific limited powers over matters
considered in 1789 as of national importance. All powers not so delegated are retained
by the individual States and, ultimately, by the people. 7 After sketching this constitutional
setting, Professor Yntema observes that the federal government's constitutional power to
provide for the general welfare and to regulate inter-State and foreign commerce
authorizes federal legislation to address the "vital concerns" of a national economy.
Writing after the extraordinary mobilization of national resources during the economic
depression and World War II, he states that it is impossible to anticipate the limits on
these constitutional powers given their elasticity. Only the Supreme Court's 1938
decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins8 suggested some limit to the influence of federal
bodies on the unification of law. That decision reversed Justice Joseph Story's nineteenth
century decision in Swift v. Tyson, 9 which legitimated application of a "federal
common law" in many commercial disputes between parties from different States.
Developments since the 1940s bear out Professor Yntema's prognosis. 10 Federal
legislation regulating civil rights and providing for cdrsumer and environmental
protections are grounded on the commerce clause. There are intimations that the
7 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8 and amend. X.
8 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
10 Although Professor Yntema recognized the potential for federal regulation he did not anticipate
at least one technique used to encourage uniformity: the withholding of federal benefits to States that do not
conform with stated behavior. Until recently, for example, the federal government withheld funds for
highways if a State did not raise to twenty-one the age at which persons could purchase and consume
alcoholic beverages.
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sitting U.S. Supreme Court will establish some limits on the potential scope of this
clause but so far it has done so only hesitantly and at the extremes. 11 As a constitu-
tional matter, therefore, there are few areas in which the federal government could not
legislate. This, however, merely converts the debate from one about what is consti-
tutionally authorized to one about what is politically appropriate. The boundaries of
what is appropriate will fluctuate, but there is remarkable agreement on basics. Private
civil law is generally left to the States. Except for fiscal matters, for example, rules
governing real property, personal status, and inheritance are found in State law. The
Uniform Commercial Code, which governs the non-regulatory aspects of most domes-
tic commercial transactions, is not federal law; it applies throughout the United States
only because each State has enacted the text separately. Even where the needs of a
national economy might suggest otherwise, there are surprising enclaves of exclusive
or concurrent State regulation. Insurance companies, for example, are regulated by
State agencies, while State banks coexist with national banks chartered under federal
banking legislation. Contemporary debate about federal products liability legislation
and limits on penal damage awards turns, in part, on the propriety of the federal
government preempting existing non-uniform State law.
To accommodate these different perspectives, federal legislators have developed
techniques that allow for a continuing role for State law - at the expense, however, of
the unification of law. The several consumer laws incorporated at different times into
the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, for example, adopt a formula that
provides that the federal legislation does not "annul, alter, or affect [State law] . . .
except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with the [federal law]." 12 As a
result there are minimum federal standards for consumer transactions subject to
higher, non-uniform protections offered by individual States. Another technique is to
regulate specifically a particular topic and delegate broader authority to a federal
agency but leave consistent State law in place until that agency issues regulations. The
1987 Expedited Funds Availability Act, for example, regulates in detail the return of
dishonored checks but delegates to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System authority to regulate "any aspect" of the payment system or "any related func-
tion of the payment system with respect to checks." 13 Until such time as the Board
acts, however, the relevant provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code will continue
to regulate the collection of checks. That to date the Board has declined to exercise its
delegated authority reflects, at least in part, its judgment that to do so would intrude
on appropriate State legislation.
No matter where they stand in these debates about where to draw the line in
these various debates, most commentators agree that federal legislation is the most
11 United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (federal statute forbidding any
person from possessing a firearm in a local school zone held to exceed commerce clause authority).
12 See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S. Code § 1610 (1988) ("truth in lending").
13 12 U.S. Code § 4008(c)(1) (1988).
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likely vehicle for providing unification of law in the United States. "Federal legislation
and regulations issued by federal agencies are," reports Professor Gray, "the major
sources of uniformity in the United States today .... At the present time [19851 we are
in the midst of an explosion of federal activity, including some intrusion into private
law areas traditionally reserved to State law." 14 He cites, in particular, consumer legis-
lation and related agency regulations as an illustration of burgeoning federal law-
making. Professor Morris Shanker, a self-confessed believer that uniformity is a worth-
while objective, concurs.1 5 While conceding that the best way to achieve uniformity
is through federal legislation, he favors uniform acts prepared by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws because they produce legislation of a higher quality than that
of congressional staff committees. 16 He fears, however, that interest groups will seek
federal action because relatively few uniform acts have been widely enacted. 17
Recent political elections may suggest that Professor Shanker's fears are exag-
gerated. Leaders of both political parties talk about down-sizing the federal govern-
ment and returning authority to the States. Many of these leaders are not only willing
to tolerate non-uniform State regulation, but they even welcome it. Historical
perspective suggests, however, some skepticism that there has been a "revolution" that
will stem the outpouring of federal law. Predictions of a similar trend in the decisions
of the Supreme Court may also be premature despite intimations that the court is
willing to reexamine earlier decisions upholding federal power.
From the perspective of promoting unification, however, the principal obser-
vation about the role of federal courts is left unstated by Professor Yntema. For, despite
its name, the Supreme Court does not exercise general supervision of the private law
decisions of State courts. When disputes arise between citizens of different States,
federal courts exercising "diversity jurisdiction" may apply State law. When doing so,
the federal courts defer to State law as directed by the Erie decision noted by Professor
Yntema. Few of these diversity cases, however, end up in the Supreme Court or
appellate courts so decisions in the cases have little unifying effect.
As for court-created federal common law, Professor Yntema's reports of its
demise were premature although it lives on in an attenuated form to fill the interstices
of federal legislation or to govern the conduct of federal entities.18
14 Gray, supra note 5, at 122-123.
15 Morris Shanker, he American Experience on Harmonization (Uniformity) of State Laws, 12
Canadian Bus. L.J. 433, 439 (1986-87).
16 Id. at 438-440.
17 Id. at 441.
18 Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 883
(1986).
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(2) THE CONCEPTION OF A COMMON LAW, AS ESPECIALLY INCULCATED BY THE LEADING LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE LEGAL LITERATURE PRODUCED UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE
Homogenous instruction in national law schools is, Professor Yntema suggests, an
even more basic force for uniformity. Graduates from a few elite law schools become
instructors in other schools. These instructors bring with them a common technique of'
instruction and they use a limited number of casebooks that usually follow a common
pattern. Textbooks, treatises, and a national system of case reports reinforce the uni-
form educational experience of law students and lawyers. It is, writes Professor
Yntema, "scarcely possible to over-emphasize the importance of this tradition."
19
In the intervening years the scene he sketched has become much more varied.
Following the significant expansion of law study in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
professorate is no longer dominated by instructors from a few elite schools. Many
schools in this same period also eliminated curriculum requirements, especially in the
last two years of the standard three years of law study. Students were offered a greater
choice of specialized courses, ranging from supervised clinical experiences to interdis-
ciplinary seminars. Instruction by the "Socratic method" is now the exception as
acceptable methods have proliferated. The photocopy machine and computers have
also made it possible for instructors to prepare their own teaching materials rather
than rely on the few published casebooks.
Scholarship in this same period has also diversified to the point that one author
recently wrote that "[tihe conceptual disarray of legal scholarship has become so
familiar to us that we have ceased to regret it." 20 Doctrinal studies are dclass6. With
few exceptions, treatises of "national law" in the tradition of Joseph Story and Samuel
Williston are no longer written - or valued by the academy. 2 1 In this context it is
difficult to know what vision students have of law.
During this same period the institution of continuing legal education or CLE has
taken root. Many State bars now require practicing attorneys to attend a certain
number of lectures each year. Many of these courses focus on the practical needs of
attorneys whose practice consists in the application of local law. Much of this
practice, moreover, requires attention to local statutes and regulations because in this
same period statutes have encroached more and more on the traditional common law
based on case precedents. In any event, systematic citation of court decisions from
other jurisdictions is unlikely. CLE lecturers naturally examine the peculiarities of this
local practice rather than emphasizing a general concept of a common law.
19 Yntema, supra note 1, at 309.
20 Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1393 (1996).
21 A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of
Legal Literature, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 632, 676-679 (1981); Contemporary Commercial Law Literature in the




Professor Yntema concedes that it is difficult to measure the influence - which he
says cannot be overemphasized - of these elements of legal culture. Given the
developments traced above one can at least suggest that law schools and legal
literature no longer reinforce a concept of a national law to the same extent as they
might have fifty years ago.
(3) ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS
In a brief paragraph, Professor Yntema argues that national bar associations have
also been a powerful influence in the unification movement. One of the objectives of
the founders of the American Bar Association in 1878 was to promote "uniformity of
legislation throughout the Union." 22 It was subsequently instrumental in the formation
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute.
The American Bar Association continues to contribute primarily through the
voluntary participation of its members in committee law reform projects. Examples
can be found in virtually every Section of the Association. Recent revision of the
Uniform Commercial Code, for example, has relied heavily on A.B.A. committee task
force reports. 23 Rapid growth in membership has provided a pool of potential
participants in these efforts. Toleration not only of the proliferation of committees and
subcommittees but also of overlapping committee mandates even within a single
Section- have provided opportunities for virtually any project a particular member
might be interested in. Although membership in committees is usually subject to
appointment, it is rare that a volunteer is turned'away.
Reform of the law rather than unification of the law is the usual motive of these
participants. Nevertheless, there are more formal links with the unification process.
Uniform laws prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws are usually presented to the A.B.A. House of Delegates for its approval and
anticipated objections by delegates may delay adoption of a final text. For specific
uniform law projects there may also be formal A.B.A. participation. It has become the
custom, for example, for the Association to appoint a "liaison" to drafting committees
revising the various Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code. Circulation of the
reports by these liaisons ensure widespread knowledge of proposed revisions.
These activities have the advantages and disadvantages of a lawmaking process
that relies on volunteers. Not having to pay for the time of volunteers, the cost of pro-
ducing draft legislative texts is less. Volunteers often bring expertise that would not
22 1 A.B.A. Rep. 30 (1878).
23 See, e.g., An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 984 (1991) (prepared by a task force of the A.B.A.
Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of title, Committee of the
Uniform Commercial Code); An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 45 Bus. Law. 1521(1990) (prepared by the task force on the study of U.C.C. Article 5).
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otherwise be readily available. At the same time, a volunteer system that does not
regulate rigorously a conflict-of-interest policy may skew drafts to favor some interest
groups to the disadvantage of the less organized. Volunteers also turn over frequently
as professional demands on their lives may require them to drop in and out of commit-
tee work. In the absence of a detailed study of the American Bar Association's impact
on legislative initiatives, an assessment of its volunteer system must be impressionistic.
(4) NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
Professor Yntema briefly summarizes the work of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the production of uniform and model laws
for enactment by individual States. He traces the organization of the National Confe-
rence to the appointment of New York commissioners under an 1890 State law and a
first national meeting of commissioners from different States in 1892. As of 1945, the
Conference had prepared over 100 uniform acts or model laws of which seventy were
on the active list. Only two acts - the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act - were adopted by all States. Thirty or more States
had adopted six other uniform acts, and twenty or more States had adopted an
additional thirteen acts. This product, as has already been pointed out, Professor
Yntema characterizes as "not inconsiderable and yet not satisfactory."
The National Conference's greatest successes during the first fifty years were its
uniform commercial law act. Its greatest success during the ensuing fifty years has
been the Uniform Commercial Code, which consolidated and reformulated the earlier
uniform acts. At the time of its centenary there were 99 uniform acts, twenty-four
model acts, and twelve other recommended acts on the Conference's approved list.
Over the years the Conference had withdrawn 141 texts from that list.24 Only eight of
the uniform acts had been adopted by all fifty States and approximately 40% of these
acts had become the law in less than ten jurisdictions.25 Virtually all of the texts set
out substantive legal rules; the Conference has shown little interest and even less
aptitude when it comes to conflict of laws issues. 26
Commissioners continue to have a quasi-official status. They are appointed as
uniform commissioners under non-uniform State laws which rarely specify qualifi-
cations. Although their expenses are usually covered their time is volunteered. They
commit to promoting the uniform texts adopted by the Conference even if their State
delegation may have voted against the text when proposed. Their interests and exper-
24 Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Service: A Centennial History of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 130 (1991).
25 Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J.
Legal Stud. 131, 134-135 (1996).
26 See, however, a recent proposal that the National Conference should undertake to prepare a




tise range widely but they share a belief that unification through uniform State
legislation is virtually always preferable to federal action. As the National Confe-
rence's centennial history states, "[t]he voluntary enactment of uniform State laws by
the State legislatures seems to be generally accepted as more desirable and more
feasible than an expansion of federal power." 27
Although it relies, in effect, on volunteers and thus suffers from some of the same
defects outlined above in the discussion of the activities of American Bar Association
members, the National Conference does have an Executive Director, a permanent
staff, and a coherent committee structure. Its budget is limited although a recently-
established foundation provides endowment income to support its activities. These
funds permit the hiring of reporters who are not uniform law commissioners to
prepare the texts reviewed by the drafting committee.
Recent criticism of the National Conference's lawmaking process has stirred
heated debate. Professor Kathleen Patchel writes that in the light of modern group
theory this process is "an inadequate mechanism for drafting commercial legislation
designed to reach reasonable accommodation among the interests of all affected
groups." 28 Using the tools of "structure-induced equilibrium," Professors Alan Schwartz
and Robert Scott conclude that the institution (a) has a strong status quo bias that
induces it to reject significant reform; (b) frequently produces highly abstract rules that
delegate substantial discretion to courts; and (c) produces clear, bright-line rules that
confine judicial discretion commonly when and because dominant interest groups
influence the process. 29
From yet another perspective, Professors Larry Ribstein and Bruce Kobayashi
draw on economic analysis to support the conclusion that States efficiently select
National Conference proposals that are efficient, but also adopt many inefficient Con-
ference texts because of lobbying efforts by the commissioners. 30 They also suggest
that in some cases a uniform legal - and efficient - rule would evolve if courts
enforced choice-of-law clauses.31
These critiques are too recent for observers to evaluate whether they will have a
long-term impact on the National Conference's procedures. An immediate response
has been for the Conference to make a concerted effort to support participation by
consumer interest groups. The Conference has also extended invitations to non-
commissioners to observe its annual meetings. In a recent conciliatory response to the
27 Armstrong, supra note 23, at 129.
28 Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some
Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 83, 162 (1993).
29 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 595, 597 (1995).
30 Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 24, 186-187.
31 Id. at 179-181.
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critics, the Conference's Executive Director concludes that "[a]s long as NCCUSL
continues to listen to serious suggestions for improvement - and allows the process to
evolve and adapt to changed circumstances - there is no reason to believe that the
success of the last one hundred years cannot be carried forward." 32
(5) AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
Professor Yntema writes at far greater length about the American Law Institute.
Established in 1923 to clarify the common law, the Institute had, at the time he wrote,
worked principally upon a Restatement of the Law. This Restatement constitutes "a
singular species of codification." It is, he says, essentially an unofficial digest of the
common law "as it is" stated as black-letter rules. These rules were accompanied by
comments and illustrations but without citation of authority. While the Institute had
prepared a Code of Criminal Procedure and had agreed in 1944 to collaborate with
the National Conference in the drafting of a Uniform Commercial Code, the Institute
was known for restating law rather than reforming it. Professor Yntema is not
uncritical. He recognizes deficiencies in the restatement project, especially its "curious
theory" that law should be restated as it is rather than to resolve divergent cases or to
clarify obscurities. Nevertheless, he points to the value of both the process and the
product. By stimulating discussion of numerous topics, the process has educated
participants and laid the foundation for further developments. The product itself has
been frequently cited by the courts, although Professor Yntema concedes that whether
the Restatement has increased uniformity remains inconclusive.
Professor Yntema today would find the Institute transformed. Despite talk of
winding itself up following completion of the final components of the Restatement of
Law in the early 1940s, the Institute continued. While it remains elitist its membership
has both grown significantly in numbers and in diversity, especially within the last
decade. Its membership is now limited to 3,000, making it approximately ten times
the size of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. At the
same time, many more members than in the past now have an opportunity to
participate in the work of the Institute not only at its annual sessions but also in
members' consultative groups for each project. Additional membership has meant
additional sources of revenue and these funds have been used to pay reporters and
commission preliminary studies.
The Institute's work product has also evolved and diversified. The Restatement is
now in its third iteration and has been transformed. The printed text of the recently-
adopted Restatement Third of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty, for example, now
includes the Reporter's Notes listing the authority relied upon. 3 3 Although nominally
32 Fred H. Miller, The Future of Uniform State Legislation in the Private Law Area, 79 Minn. L.
Rev. 861, 876 (1995).
33 Restatement (3d) of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty (1996).
RDU 1996-4
Peter Winship
building on the 1941 Restatement of the Law of Security, the new Restatement relies
more heavily on legislation and on the practices of professional sureties and guarantors.
For the most part, the reporter ably reconciles the different practices of the profes-
sional sureties and the commercial guarantors. Debates among the advisers, however,
sometimes were more similar to those found in committees of legislatures and some
comments can only be explained as an accommodation to one group or the other.
The Restatement Third, however, is not the only work product. The Institute
continues to participate with the National Conference in work on the Uniform
Commercial Code and it does not hesitate to suggest legislation when appropriate.
The Institute has, for example, recently begun work on a project to propose revisions
to the Federal Judicial Code. 34 In areas where a component of the Restatement is
considered inappropriate, the Institute has produced Principles setting out appropriate
policies to be observed by courts and legislatures. At present, for example, the Institute
is working on Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.35 The Institute has also
undertaken "Projects" that explore particular subjects. As part of a transnational
insolvency project, for example, reporters have prepared narrative descriptions of U.S.
and Canadian bankruptcy rules and practices; a similar narrative for Mexico will
round out the initial stage of the project.36 Both Principles and Projects lay the
groundwork for unification but do not necessarily lead to uniform legislation.
At least some critics of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws extend their critique to the work of the Institute. Much like the Conference,
the Institute has responded to specific suggestions for improvement in procedures.
There is, however, little criticism of the form of the Restatement which Professor
Yntema found so curious. The evolution of the Restatement format and the flexibility
of the Institute's other work products satisfy many of the concerns expressed by earlier
critics.
III. - To the preceding review of Professor Yntema's "institutions" must now be
added a new factor: participation by the United States in international unification
projects. As noted earlier, Professor Yntema bemoaned the failure of the United States
to participate in these international efforts. He later had the opportunity to support the
proposal that the United States join UNIDROIT and the Hague Conference on Private
International Law but he never had an opportunity to develop his thoughts on what
this implied for unification of law within the United States. Yet of all the developments
in the last fifty years, this new need to relate domestic and international unification
efforts has perhaps the most long-term significance for future legal developments.
34 Report of the Director, in The American Law Institute Annual Reports 1, 7 (1996).
35 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, Tent. Draft No. 2
(March 14, 1996).
36 International Statement of United States Bankruptcy Law, Discussion Draft (Apr. 17, 1996);
International Statement of Canadian Bankruptcy Law, Prel. Draft No. 2 (May 1, 1996).
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Writing in the mid-1940s, however, Professor Yntema could not anticipate the
shift in thinking about the propriety of the United States government participating in
international unification efforts. It had long been assumed that there were constitu-tional
limitations on such participation. 37 As early as 1876, for example, the United States
declined an invitation to participate in a Congress of Jurisconsults on various legal
topics, such as uniformity in the form of contracts. The Secretary of State's letter states:
"[P]ursuant to the Constitution of the United States, the several States have
reserved powers which it is not competent for this government to trench upon either
by Act of Congress or by Treaty with a foreign power. Some of the subjects indicated
[in the invitation] as proper for consideration by the proposed Congress, are such as
this Government has no authority to entertain, as they are under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the several States of the Union." 38
Subsequent Secretaries of State took a similar stand. When U.S. delegations did
attend later international conferences they repeated the same reservations on the
possibility that the United States would become a party to any treaty produced. Even
after the Supreme Court's 1920 decision in Missouri v. Holland39 held that a validly-
concluded treaty 40 on migratory birds authorized Congressional legislation even
though Congress had no specific authority under the Constitution, the executive was
reluctant to act. A 1928 Statement by Charles Evans Hughes, before he became Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, is frequently cited. Use of the treaty power for ."the
conduct of international relations" is proper but use of the power "to control matters
which normally and appropriately were within the local jurisdiction of the States"
might be unconstitutional.41
Most scholars agreed with this constitutional analysis. In 1917 John Henry Wig-
more, author of Wigmore on Evidence as well as a uniform law commissioner from
Illinois, wrote that the problem of how America could participate in the preparation of
"world-legislation" ("the international aspect of the substantive national law affecting
the relations between individuals of different States - . . . private law, so-called - in
short, law of the kind that the practicing lawyer ordinarily uses in the affairs of clients;
the kind that constitutes 99% of the law of daily life for all of us") was "the greatest
problem of the future for our law."42 His conclusion rested on the following analysis:
37 For a historical review of the U.S. position, see Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The
Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules of Private Law, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 323 (1954).
38 Letter of Hamilton Fish (Jan. 24, 1976), quoted in id. at 325-326.
39 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
40 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 (The President "shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur').
41 Quoted in Report.of the Special Committee on International Unification of Private Law, 1961
A.B.A. Rep. 219, 248.
42 John Henry Wigmore, Problems of World-Legislation and America's Share Therein, 4 Va. L.
Rev. 423, 423-424 (1917).
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I The Federal Legislature of the United States has no power to adopt a uniform
international rule which shall be actually effective throughout the country; it has
only two very limited powers, each of which will still leave at least two distinct
rules of law in operation within each State: (a) The first is its power over inter-
State and foreign commerce; (b) The second is its power to make treaties for
solving conflicts of law.
II. The several State legislatures have all the remaining power to adopt a uniform
international rule; but they never have exercised and never will unitedly exercise
this power by adopting some uniform international rule; and therefore the
prospect of any share for us in world-legislation is hopeless by this method.
43
He later qualified this analysis in the light of Missouri v. Holland, admitting that
the federal treaty power might theoretically be broader than previously thought but
concluding that it was unlikely to be used in the near future.
44
Dean Wigmore was, however, one of the few persons to propose a solution to
the constitutional inhibitions: resort to the "compact" clause of the federal consti-
tution, which authorizes States to enter into agreements or compacts with foreign
governments with the consent of Congress. 45 In a report to the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, he outlined how his proposal would work:
First of all, Congress would by general law give its consent in advance that a State
may make a compact with one or more foreign powers upon a specified subject of
law - let us say, for example, the law of warehouse receipts. Next, when an
international conference is called on the law of that subject, one or more important
commercial States will, by their legislatures, authorize delegates to be sent to that
conference to sign a convention. The delegates will include a senator, a
representative, and two or three eminent professional experts in the legal and
commercial fields involved. These delegates will have voting powers in the
conference; hence their arguments and votes will avail to secure some compromise in
favor of important American ideas. Finally, the draft adopted by the conference will be
brought back directly to each State Legislature for ratification. And the personal
interest of the delegation, the influence of the legislative members in the delegation,
and the State pride in having shared in a world-conference, will present some strong
prospect of securing adoption. Thus, the international rule will become the rule for
that State. Thereafter, its acceptance by one or more powerful American States for that
43 Id. at 430.
44 1921 Handbook Nat'l Conf. Commissioners on Uniform St. Laws 297, 348-349. A 1924 report
sets out yet another possible scenario. Report of the Committee on a Uniform Act for Compacts and
Agreements between States, 1924 Handbook 674, 677.
45 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 ('No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power').
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class of commercial transaction will induce, and in some cases will compel, other
States to follow the example. And thus uniformity will gradually be attained.
46
When, however, representatives of the National Conference approached the State
Department they were politely but firmly rebuffed. "We find the officials of the State
Department who have been consulted to be reluctant to concede in advance, any lack
of constitutional power on the part of the Federal Government to deal with the
subjects referred to or to acknowledge any limitation upon the power of the United
States which would render it necessary for the States to co-operate with the Federal
Government in such respects by means of State Compacts." 4 7 The Conference quietly
dropped the proposal.
So matters stood when Professor Yntema wrote. United States economic hege-
mony in the years immediately following World War II forced a reassessment. A more
immediate catalyst was the visit to the United States by Dr. Mario Matteucci, then Sec-
retary-General of UNIDROIT. As Joe C. Barrett, a uniform law commissioner from
Arkansas who was then president of the National Conference, later testified before Con-
gress, Dr. Matteucci's appearance before the annual session of the National Conference
turned on the light bulb. 4 8 Mr. Barrett successfully persuaded the American Bar Asso-
ciation to appoint a special committee on international unification of private law in
1958. The A.B.A. House of Delegates approved in principle the special committee's
report in 196149 and, after the endorsement of established Sections of the A.B.A., the
House of Delegates adopted a resolution in 1963 recommending that the United States
become a party to UNIDROIT and the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. 50 In a masterful brief in support of its recommendation, the 1961 Report concludes
that the treaty power is limited to genuine international concerns but that what is an
international concern fluctuates to adjust to changing circumstances and that existing
political organs will be sensitive to the political as well as constitutional checks in the
federal system. 5 1 With this support from the private sector, the State Department
undertook to have Congress approve membership in these international bodies.
46 1921 Handbook, supra note 27, at 326-327.
47 Report of the Committee on Uniform Act for Compacts and Agreements between States, 1927
Handbook Nat'l Conf. Commissioners on Uniform St. Laws 775, 777.
48 Hearing on U.S. Participation in the Hague Conference and the Rome Institute (Sept. 16, 1963)
before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 13 (1963).
49 Report of the Special Committee on International Unification of Private Law, 1961 A.B.A. Rep.
219, 248.
50 1963 A.B.A. Rep. 107 & 339-343.
51 Report of the Special Committee, supra note 50, at 248.
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In his submission of the proposal to Congress, Acting Secretary of State George
Ball emphasized that "[s]uccessful efforts to harmonize laws relating to international
trade, commerce, and financial interchange will go far to facilitate transactions cross-
ing international boundary lines." 52 For this and other reasons, Mr. Ball recommended
membership subject, however, "to the working out of suitable arrangements to meet
the special requirements of the U.S. Federal system." 5 3 A Statement by the State
Department's legal adviser, Abram Chayes, reflected similar concerns When he noted
that uniform legislation would be preferable to conventions. 54 Mr. Barrett also
testified, stating that because international trade had an impact on the agricultural eco-
nomy of his State "[wle are not talking here about super government, and one world,
but it is a very practical problem of harmonizing rules of private law." 55 Even Pro-
fessor Yntema, who was unable to be present in person, wrote the House committee.
With respect to constitutional concerns, he submitted that fear that membership would
infringe on areas of private law reserved to the States by the Constitution was
specious. "[F]acilitation of international commerce in this manner by Federal offices,
and the improvement of the laws by which it may be affected, does not, and should
not, import implementation by federal legislation, except as expressly authorized by
the Constitution. In matters within the province of State legislation, there is no
apparent reason why the results of such participation requiring legislative action
should not be treated exactly as the uniform and model laws prepared by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws." 56
Persuaded by these arguments, among others, the Senate and the House of
Representatives adopted a joint resolution supporting U.S. membership in the two
international bodies and President Lyndon Johnson signed the resolution into law on
December 30, 1963. 5 7
Having overcome previous inhibitions, supporters of U.S. participation in the
unification projects of these and other bodies faced two questions: how best to
implement a process by which State interests can be accommodated, and hoy to
integrate domestic law and legal rules generated by the international process. That the
answers to these questions are often unsatisfying reflects both the difficulty of the
issues and institutional limitations. 58
52 Letter of George W. Ball to Hon. John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives
(Aug. 9, 1963), reprinted in House Hearing, supra note 49, at 4.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 6.
55 Id. at 17.
56 Id. at 25.
57 77 Stat. 775 (1963), codified as 22 U.S. Code § 269g (1988).
58 For a history of the U.S. approach, see Peter H. Pfund, Contributing to Progressive
Development of Private International Law: The International Process and the United States Approach,
AcadLmie de droit international, Recueil des Cours, 1994-V, t. 249, 8-144.
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As for the question of how to ensure that State interests are properly accom-
modated, commentators had made various recommendations, some of which are
referred to earlier in this essay. The Secretary of State promptly appointed an Advisory
Committee on -Private International Law with representatives from the major legal
bodies interested in harmonization of private law. 59 The committee was to advise the
State Department on the policies to be put forward by U.S. delegates to the
international bodies. Members of the committee were also frequently selected as
delegates to attend international meetings and conferences.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws initially
undertook work in this field with enthusiasm. 60 The personal interest of leading
commissioners, such as Mr. Barrett, ensured that the Conference participated actively.
For several years it had financial support from the Ford Foundation to fund studies of
projects proposed by the international bodies. Interest among all participants waned
during the 1970s and into the 1980s. Leadership in the National Conference changed;
its Executive Director had little interest in the international projects. The office within
the State Department's Legal Adviser's Office charged with private international law
affairs was not given support and the first incumbent in that office, Ambassador
Richard Kearney, retired in protest. The few persons that had participated in the
Secretary of State's Advisory Committee mobilized to prevent the shutting down of
that office but knowledge of the private international law process was confined to a
small, but elite number. Only after the United States ratified the United Nations Sales
Convention was there widespread interest once again. This, together with open
government rules that required the Advisory Committee process to be opened up,
encouraged wider knowledge of developments in this field. A change in leadership in
the National Conference has led to support for active participation in the international
projects. Coordination tends so far, however, to be ad hoc.
Answers to the question of how to integrate domestic law and legal rules
generated by the international process have also been ad hoc, perhaps of necessity.
Integrating the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions into domestic rules of court,
for example, suggests the need to adjust domestic rulemaking procedures to ensure
participation by persons knowledgeable about relevant international norms and
procedures. 61 Different challenges are involved in the case of the U.N. Sales
Convention. Revision of domestic sales law raises the difficult question of determining
when, if at all, it is desirable to integrate the two sets of sales rules. Challenged to
59 Charter of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, art. I
(November 20, 1992). For a brief overview of the work of the State Department office, see Patricia B.
Rogers, Private International Law, 23 Int'l Law. 207 (1989).
60 See generally Peter Winship, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the International Unification of Private Law, 13 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 227, 260-279 (1992).
61 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International
Civil Litigation, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 103 (1994).
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articulate a systematic approach to this issue,62 the reporter for revision of Article 2
(Sales) of the Uniform Commercial Code has recently responded with a thoughtful
brief in support of the drafting committee's decision that "vertical" uniformity with the
Convention is not advisable: "(1) absence of compatible background law; (2) Article 2
is part of an integrated commercial code; (3) nature of the code; (4) limitations in
scope; (5) differences in drafting process; (6) differences in substance; and (7)
technological and transactional obsolescence." 63 Revision of the Uniform Commercial
Code's rules on letters of credit are, in turn, also sui generis because a significant
number of letters of credit involve transnational transactions, there is well-established
custom, and the International Chamber of Commerce's Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits (UCP 500) are incorporated into the credits by reference. 64
Thus, at present open questions of process and substance remain. Professor
Yntema would surely have enjoyed the challenge of working out effective answers.
IV. - Several concluding brief thoughts. Professor Yntema and others who have
reported on unification of law in the United States do not report what happens in prac-
tice outside the courts. The reason is clear: to gather the empirical evidence would be
an extraordinary task even for a limited subject area. Nevertheless, formal unity may
be an empty shell if it does not reflect actual practice. Similarly, the reports - with the
exception of the 1961 A.B.A. Special Committee report - do not explore unification
efforts by informal trade and industry groups through codified trade usages and form
contracts. Gathering this information is somewhat less daunting and should not be
ignored.
L'UNIFICATION DU DROIT AUX ETA TS-UNIS: MISEA JOUR DE LA SITUATION (Rsum6)
par Peter Winship (Professeur de droit 'James Cleo Thompson Sr. Trustee" - S.M.U School of
Law, Dallas, Texas)
II y a pros de 50 ans, le Professeur Yntema examinait dans un article publi dans
l'Unification du droit (1948, p. 301) I'6tat de l'unification du droit aux Etats Unis; il relevait
alors le r6le preponderant de cinq institutions: la structure f~drale de l'union et l'influence des
tribunaiux, la nature de la Common Law (et la contribution de la doctrine A travers
l'enseignement et les 6crits), I'activit6 des barreaux des Etats, la National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, et le American Law Institute.
62 Peter Winship, Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C. Article 2 in Light
of the United Nations Sales Convention, 37 Loy. L. Rev. 43, 45-50 (1991).
63 Richard E. Speidel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the international Sale of Goods, 16 Nw. I. Int'l L. & Bus. 165, 171 (1995).
64 James 1. White, The Influence of International Practice n the Revision oif Article 5 of the UCC,
16 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 189, 210-214 (1995).
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Que/le est la situation aujourd'hui? Reprenant l'articulation du Professeur Yntema, et
rapportant les opinions principales qui se sont exprim6es dans le d6bat doctrinaire sur l'attitude
aux Etats-Unis A l'6gard de 'iunification du droit, l'auteur constate en d6finitive que peu de
changements sont intervenus. L'attachement aux comp~tences nationales locales reste
profond~ment ancr6: si la 16gislation f6d6rale serait le meilleur moyen pour atteindre une
uniformisation du droit, les Etats ont des comp~tences tr~s larges en vertu de la Constitution
mais qui r6suhent surtout de consid6rations d'opportunit6, avec tine tendance actuelle au
renforcement de leurs comp~tences. La Cour supreme elle-mnme n'exerce pas de contrOle des
d6cisions de droit priv6 rendues par les juridictions 6tatiques. Tout en rapportant le r6le de la
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (A travers l'6laboration du Code
de commerce uniforme dont la mise en application relive des Etats) et de l'American Law
Institute (auteur des Restatements clans diff~rents domaines du droit, ainsi que de Principes et
de Projets) qui ont permis d'incorporer tin grand nombre de pratiques communes dans le
syst~me juridique am6ricain, I'uniformisation du droit n'est pas en g~n6ral per ue comme tine
priorit6.
C'est en revanche dans la participation des Etats-Unis dans les efforts d'unification
internationale que se trouve la v~ritable nouveaut6. A l'6poque oi 6crivait le Professeur
Yntema, la structure f~d6rale de l'Union et la comp~tence des Etats soulevaient des objections
majeures A l'introduction de lois uniformes conclues au niveau international. Apr~s un
processus de conviction, l'adhesion des Etats-Unis en 1963 6 Unidroit et A la Conf6rence de La
Haye de droit international priv6 a marqu6 une 6volution radicale d'attitude. Un comitd
consultatif de droit international priv6 fut alors constitu6 aupr&s du Secr6tariat d'Etat, qui
proc~de aux consultations n6cessaires. notamment avec la National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Comment preserver les int~r~ts des Etats, comment combiner le droit interne et les r6gles
juridiques cr~6es par le processus international d'unification: des r6ponses ont 6t6 apport~es au
cas par cas, laissant A ce jour le probline g~nral, tant de fond que de procedure, en suspens.
En conclusion, c'est plut6t A travers la codification des usages commerciaux par les milieux
professionnels, et ia pratique contractuelle, que l'auteur envisage la r6alit6 du droit uniforme.
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